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In an earlier number of this Journal, we
published our findings on the distribu-
tion of formal alliances among the mem-
bers of the interstate system during the
period between the Napoleonic Wars and
World War II. Our purpose there was to
present a systematic and quantitative
description of all formal alliances, their
membership, duration, and type, as well
as the procedures we used in generating
those data (Singer and Small, 1966b).
While our major motivation was to
provide the empirical basis for a number
of inquiries into the correlates of war
during that 125 years, it also seemed
likely that these data might be of use to
others in the scholarly community. 1
Since completing the original paper,
however, we have been under some
compulsion to extend our data beyond
World War II and up to the quite recent
past, so that the period on which we
concentrate is now the 150 years from
1 January 1816 to 31 December 1965.
Some of the pressure has been self-
induced and some has come via encour-
agement from the increasing number of
scholars who are now engaged in data-
based, quantitative research in interna-
tional politics.2 At the outset, we had
planned to restrict the entire project to
the 1816-1945 period, but for a variety of
scientific as well as policy reasons we later
decided to extend it up through the mid-
1960’s. Given this set of considerations,
it now seems appropriate to up-date the
earlier study and make our findings avail-
able to others whose work embraces the
two decades following Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.3
While much of the theoretical and me-
thodological discussion found in the
earlier paper need not be repeated here,
some of the latter problems are suffi-
ciently different to merit brief attention;
this is particularly true of our data sour-
ces and their reliability, to which we will
address ourselves at the outset. Following
that, we will identify and justify the com-
position of the post-1945 interstate sys-
tem and its major power sub-system,
describe the three classes of alliance with
which we are concerned, outline the
coding and measuring procedures, and
then present our results in a variety of
forms. Throughout, we will compare our
procedures and results with those of the
original study and note any deviations
therefrom; those who utilize these data
are urged to note such deviations, espe-
cially as summarized in the Appendix.
The sources of information
For a great deal of diplomatic informa-
tion, one may readily turn to the diplo-
matic archives of many national govern-
ments and to the published volumes
which subsequently embrace and codify
a large portion of those archives. But
this only holds true for materials which
are at least two (and often, more) decades
in the past; few, if any, governments
make such documents available until
twenty or more years after the fact. For
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the earlier study, then, we had the docu-
mentary evidence to make us quite con-
fident that all relevant alliances had in-
deed been identified. But for the more
recent years, it looked as if we might be
in somewhat the same situation as was
the Wilhelmstrasse in 1910; it was known
for example, that some sort of undertak-
ing existed between France and Britain,
but the German Foreign Office could not
be at all certain what the specific com-
mitments were. Similarly today, Western
scholars know that the U.S.S.R. and
North Vietnam enjoy some sort of frater-
nal relationship, for instance, but cannot
ascertain whether a formal alliance was
contracted, no less ascertain the nature
of the obligations involved. And even if
we know that a formal alliance does
exist, and have identified it, we still may
wonder whether there are secret provi-
sions which significantly alter the pub-
licly stated arrangements, and which may
not become known until the archives are
eventually opened.
The picture is not, however, quite as
bleak as it might appear. First of all, in
the period since World War I, and even
more since World War II, the League and
the United Nations have maintained a
registry wherein all treaties, conventions,
and agreements may be recorded by the
signatory governments. While registra-
tion is not compulsory, the consensus
is that a very large percentage of all post-
1945 agreements have been deposited
with the Secretariat.4 This gives us, at the
least, a single and comprehensive source
with which to begin. Second, with the
many changes in the culture of diploma-
cy, its increasing visibility, and the height-
ened role of ideological appeals and pro-
paganda moves, governments are less
and less prone to undertake secret com-
mitments. Third, and closely related, the
initiators of most of the alliances of the
past two decades have been eager to
present them - both for domestic and
foreign consumption - as strictly de-
fensive moves, undertaken reluctantly in
the face of potential aggression. Fourth,
in light of the consequences of America’s
failure to make explicit its commitments
to South Korea before June of 1950,
there has since been a strong desire to
reduce the ambiguities and uncertainties;
secrecy would not be useful in such a
context. Finally, as the material which
follows will make abundantly clear, it is
nearly impossible to think of any allian-
ces that have not already been consum-
mated - and publicized. In every part of
the world, just about any alliance that
one could reasonably expect to be made
since 1945 has been made.
Thus, despite the unavailability of the
standard archival sources, we are per-
suaded that the present compilation
includes virtually every single alliance
which satisfies the criteria which are
described below. In addition to the
United Nations Treaty Series and the
League of Nations Treaty Series, we have
turned to the governmental and second-
ary sources cited in Table 3 and in the
References for the texts of the sixty-two
qualifying alliances extant during the
post-World War II period.5
Membership in the system
It may be recalled that in the earlier
paper we differentiated between the to-
tal interstate system and its more re-
stricted sub-systems: that comprising
most of the European and a few of the
most important non-European states
(which we called the central system), and
that comprising the major powers only.
Those states which did not qualify for
inclusion in the central system were
assigned to the peripheral system. The
central peripheral distinction might have
been quite justified during the period
1816-1919, but by the end of World
War I, most of the independent nations
of the world were sufficiently interde-
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pendent, and the primacy of Europe was
sufficiently ambiguous to permit the ter-
mination of that distinction as of 1920.6
In this paper, therefore, the only two
types of nations are those which qualify
for the interstate system, and those five
which comprise the major power sub-
system after 1945.
The justification and a detailed de-
scription of our coding procedures will
be found in Singer and Small (1966a) and
Russett, Singer, and Small (1968), but
they may be summarized here. Essentially
any putatively sovereign state with a
population of at least 500,000 was includ-
ed, provided that it enjoyed the de facto
diplomatic recognition of the two ’legit-
imizers’, France and Britain. This latter
requirement was only used up through
1919, and since then the basic criterion
has been either: (a) membership in the
League or the United Nations, or (b) a
population of 500,000 or more and rec-
ognition by any two major powers.7 Be-
cause the 1816-1945 period was marked
by the consolidation and redistribution
of empires and by many major wars, the
composition of the interstate system un-
derwent frequent shifts. The post-1945
system, on the other hand, shows greater
stability. While we do see an appreciable
upsurge in system size due to the ’liquid-
ation of colonialism’, the only other
change is the disappearance of two mem-
bers. One case is that of Syria, which
’federated’ with Egypt to become a part
of the United Arab Republic from 1958
to 1961, and the other is Zanzibar, which
achieved independence in 1963 but which
joined with Tanganyika to form Tanzania
in 1964.
As to the major powers - whom we
must identify in order to treat their
alliance patterns separately later on in
the paper - the problem is more compli-
cated in the recent past than it was earlier.
There would seem to be two sets of cri-
teria here, regardless of time period; one
is the judgment and consensus of the
historians who specialize in the diplomacy
of the period, and who, in turn, largely
reflect the consensus of the practitioners.
The other might be more objective cri-
teria, such as military power, industrial
capability, or diplomatic status.
Fortunately enough, both sets of cri-
teria produce essentially the same set of
nations. Thus, for most of the nineteenth
and that part of the twentieth century
embraced in the Correlates of War pro-
ject, we find that those states which score
at or very near the top in military-indus-
trial capability and diplomatic status are
the same ones assigned to the major
power category by those whose research
focuses on the several epochs and regions
involved.8 Out of this consensus comes
the following. Going back to the pre-
World War I decades, we included: Eng-
land, France, Germany, Austria-Hun-
gary, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the Uni-
ted States. When the debris and chaos of
that war were cleared away (by the mid-
1920’s) the Hapsburgs were gone, but
the other seven remained in (or had re-
turned to) the ranks of the major powers.
In the wake of World War II, the ranks
were further reduced, leaving in 1946
only the U.S.S.R. and the United States
plus England and France; and with the
consolidation of the Communist revo-
lution and their creditable showing in the
Korean War, China entered this oligar-
chy for the first time. By 1950, then, the
major powers were exactly those nations
which had been assigned special status
(via the veto power) in the United
Nations Security Council, and which
would soon also become the five nuclear
powers.
Having summarized our criteria and
line of reasoning, we can now turn to the
system membership compilations which
emerged. In Table 1, then, we list those
states which comprised the total inter-
state system during all or part of the pe-
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riod 1946-65. They are listed by regional
location with their standardized code
numbers to the left and their date of entry
into the system shown to the right; if
their qualification for membership pre-
ceded 1946, no date is shown, and if
they did not remain in the system for the
entire twenty years (Syria and Zanzibar)
the dates of departure and/or return are
shown as well.9
Table 1. Membership in the Interstate System, 1946-65
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Table 1. Membership in the Interstate System, 1946-65 (cont.)
Coding the alliances
With the spatial-temporal domain iden-
tified, we can now turn to the alliances
entered into by the members of the de-
fined system during the twenty years
under study, or carried over from prior
years. It may be recalled that we defined
three different classes of alliance in the
original study: defense pacts, neutrality
and non-aggression pacts, and ententes,
with the following distinguishing char-
acteristics. In the defense pact (Class I),
the signatories obligated themselves to
intervene militarily on behalf of one
another if either were attacked. In the
neutrality pact (Class II), the commit-
ment was to remain militarily neutral if
the partner were attacked. And in the
entente (Class III), the only obligation
was to consult with, or cooperate, in such
a military contingency. Treaties of friend-
ship, etc. (which we do not include)
merely involve a more general promise of
mutual cordiality.lo
The treaty obligations were ascertained
by a literal reading of the texts, supple-
mented (if there were any verbal ambi-
guities) by the interpretations of the
diplomatic historians. In other words,
the classification is not sensitive to the
political relations of the governments
involved, nor to interpretations made by
other governments. Second, no indirect
alliance obligations were inferred via
overlapping memberships. That is, even
if nation B was allied with both A and C
via separate treaties, A and C were not
treated as allies unless they were both
also signatories to the same treaty of
alliance. Third, a variety of more general
commitments were not classified as al-
liances. Among those excluded were : (a)
charters of global or quasi-global in-
ternational organizations, such as the
League, the United Nations, or their
specialized agencies; (b) treaties of guar-
antee to which all relevant parties regis-
tered their assent, such as the 1960 Greek-
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Turkish guarantee of Cyprus; (c) con-
ventions or agreements setting out gen-
eral rules of state behavior, such as the
Geneva Conventions; (d) ’mutual secu-
rity’ arrangements which involve bases,
financial aid, and training programs ex-
clusively, such as the Spanish-American
Treaty; (e) unilateral and asymmetric
guarantees, such as the 1951 Japanese-
American security treaty, in which only
one signatory is committed to defend the
other. On the latter rule, we must reiter-
ate that we are concerned exclusively
with the commitments and resultant
cross-pressures which bind two or more
states to concert their policies in time of
crisis. An alliance, in other words, must
contain at least two member states.
Without this distinction, any pronounce-
ment which declared that one nation
would protect the territory of another
nation would have to be considered as an
alliance. For example, in 1951, Egypt
denounced her 1936 alliance with Eng-
land, but England refused to accept this
unfriendly gesture and maintained that
the alliance was still in force. Obviously,
after 1951, the 1936 alliance became a
unilateral (and unwanted) guarantee of
the territory of Egypt by England,
signifying something quite different
from reciprocal obligation and cooper-
ation.
Let us shift now from the nature of the
alliance commitments which concern us
here to the problem of identifying the
span of time during which they are in
force. In this connection, a preliminary
point is in order, clarifying the connection
between the data presented here and
those shown in the original paper. Our
major purpose in gathering alliance data
is to ascertain the extent to which the
resulting clusters and configurations cor-
relate with the onset of war in the years
following each set of observations of such
alliance distributions. We have, there-
fore - and those who use our data for
other purposes should take careful note -
not included any alliances which were
consummated by nations while participa-
ting in war or within three months prior
to such participation, unless those al-
liances emerged from the war intact.
Likewise, no alliances consummated
during either of the World Wars were
included unless they, too/continued in
force during the post-war period.ll One
effect of this particular coding rule is to
make it unnecessary for us to cover the
1914-18 and 1939-45 periods, and this is
what accounts for the gap between the
dates in the original paper and those used
here.
Turning, then, to the effective dates of
any alliance, the beginning date was a
relatively simple matter. Even though
some months may pass between the nec-
essary signatures and ratification, the
former date is always used; if, however,
the treaty failed of ratification (such as
EDC) it is of course not included at all.
As to termination dates, the problem -
especially in more recent years - is more
complex. That is, with the decreasing
incidence of formal (or even informal)
abrogations or denunciations of alliances,
the termination of a treaty whose text
does not specify an expiration date can
become difficult to pin-point. Thus, we
have in several cases had to make a po-
litical judgment as to the year in which
the obligations were no longer effectively
binding on one, several, or all of the sig-
natories. A good example might be
Yugoslavia’s leaving the Cominform in
1948. Even though not all of the states
which had joined in the Soviet bloc’s alli-
ance system (via the several bilateral
treaties of 1945 and 1946) formally abro-
gated their commitments, it seems evident
that neither the Yugoslav nor the other
governments considered themselves
bound after the Tito regime’s expulsion.
So that the user will know the basic
reason for the termination dates assigned
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Table 2. Alliances which terminated during 1946-65
to those twelve of the sixty-nine qualify-
ing alliances which did become, in our
judgment, ineffective during the 1946-65
period, we indicate them briefly in Table
2.
Another problem of a chronological
nature is that of new alliance agreements
which are undertaken between and
among governments which were already
allied. The question here is one of deter-
mining which commitment takes pre-
cedence, since we are concerned not
merely with whether or not certain states
are allied, but ascertaining the nature or
class of that commitment. We begin with
the assumption that - in terms of the
obligations undertaken - a defense pact
imposes greater commitments than a neu-
trality or non-aggression pact, and that
each of these imposes a greater commit-
ment than an entente. Therefore, when-
ever any two or more signatories to a
treaty with lower level obligations subse-
quently join in one with greater obliga-
tions - and this says nothing about the
probability of such obligations being ful-
filled - the latter takes precedence and
the former is no longer included for
computational purposes. Conversely, if
an entente were consummated between or
among states which were already mem-
bers of a defense pact, for example, the
entente would not be included in our
compilations, even though it followed the
defense pact in the chronological sense.
A final question arises from cases in
which a number of bilateral treaties of a
given class and national membership is
followed (or preceded) by a multilateral
one of the same class and membership.
In such cases, the multilateral alliance
takes priority and the bilateral ones are
dropped from our computations. Typi-
cal of these would be the post-World
War II bilateral arrangements which were
superseded by the Warsaw and NATO
pacts. It should be stressed here that
these coding rules are not meant to imply
that the superseded alliance is considered
to be terminated and no longer in effect.
They serve only to make our indicators of
alliance aggregation and alliance com-
mitment, as discussed below, more con-
sonant with the empirical realities which
they are meant to measure, and hence
more valid.
The results of these coding procedures
and classification criteria are shown in
Table 3. In addition to the names of
the signatory states, we show the dates
of inception and termination, the alliance
class (defense, neutrality, or entente) and
the place in which its text may most
conveniently be found.
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Table 3. Interstate Alliances in Force, 1946-65
NOTES
1 Classes of Alliance are : 1-Defense Pact; 2-Neutrality or Non-Aggression Pact; 3-Entente.
2 Asterisk (*) following termination date indicates that the alliance was superseded by another
arrangement.









Before turning to the conversion pro-
cedures by which these raw data are
made more useful for research purposes,
it might be helpful to present some simple
summaries. The most general summary,
found in Table 4, shows the frequency
distribution of those alliances which were
in force, according to our criteria, among
the states which constituted the system
during all or part of the twenty years
which concern us here. It should be noted
that the total number of alliances shown
here (80) comes to more than the 69
alliances actually in effect, since several
of the multilateral ones link not only
major powers with non-majors (minors),
but majors with majors, and minors with
minors, thus falling into more than one
of the rows.
Table 4. Distribution of Alliances
by C’lass and Signatories, 1946-65
If we may be permitted one interpretive
comment here, it is worth noting how few
neutrality and/or non-aggression pacts
are found during these two recent
decades. While there were only four such
arrangements during the 1816-99 period,
accounting for 11 per cent of the nine-
teenth century alliances, that number
rose sharply to 37 (or 48 per cent) during
the 1900-39 period. But the number
dropped sharply for the post-World War
II period, with the seven neutrality pacts
accounting for only 9 per cent of all the
alliances in force at any time during
those twenty years. The non-aggression
pact, which is one variation of the tradi-
tional neutrality pact, was clearly an
invention of the 1920’s and 1930’s, and
if the amount of war which followed is
any indication, they were not particularly
effective. Given that experience, it is little
wonder that only four such alliances were
consummated after World War II and all
of these involved China; the other three
were signed during the heyday of the
’non-aggression’ era between the two
world wars.
It might also be noted that the per-
centage of ententes - a modest consul-
tative obligation - remained constant
after the ceremonies in Tokyo Bay.
Ententes accounted for 23 per cent of the
nineteenth century alliances and 22 per
cent and 23 per cent respectively, for both
twentieth century periods; the latter fig-
ures somewhat overstate their import-
ance, since all but a few of those since
1945 were consummated among the mi-
nor non-Western states. Be that as it may,
given the very low frequency of the class
II (non-aggression) alliances, we have,
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for the aggregate computational purposes
outlined in the next section, combined
them with those of class III.
An alternate way of summarizing the
data is to shift from the number of alli-
ances (and alliance bonds) to the number
of national alliance commitments, count-
ing each individual nation-to-nation com-
mitment. Applying the formula n(n-1) to
the 21-nation Rio Pact, for example, we
get 420 national commitments. The fre-
quencies resulting from this set of compu-
tations are found in Table 5, as follows:
Table 5. Distribution of Nation-to-Nation
Alliance Commitments by Class and Signatories,
1946-65
Annual alliance indicators
Returning once more to the presentation
of our data, there is the problem to which
we alluded earlier: how can the raw
alliance figures be converted into a form
which is useful for correlational analysis
over time? That is, if our concern is to
ascertain the extent to which alliance
patterns predict to, and correlate with,
fluctuations in the incidence of war, or
any other types of event, the raw data
must be converted into a variety of annual
indicators.
As in the original paper, we suggest
two different measures of this particular
structural attribute of the interstate
system. One, called Alliance Aggregation,
reflects the percentage of states of a given
type which belong to one or more allian-
ces of any given class in each successive
year. The other, called Alliance Commit-
ment, is a bit more complex, and reflects
the number of nation-to-nation com-
mitments per system member for each
year. 12
In addition to the computation pro-
cedures, there are two specific coding
rules worth reiterating. First, any pair of
states may have more than one alliance
commitment in force at any given time.
But, second, we only count the strongest
or most dominant bond which any state
has vis-A-vis any other. Defense pacts
take precedence over neutrality pacts,
and these take precedence over ententes,
and if A is in both a defense pact and an
entente with B, the latter bond is not in-
cluded in the computation. To illustrate,
then, if the Alliance Commitment Indi-
cator (ACI) for a given year is 7.12 (as in
1946 for all classes of commitments
among all states in the system) there was
an average of 7.12 alliance commitments
per state; a figure of 1.00 indicates an
average of one such commitment per
state, but tells us of course nothing about
the concentration or dispersion of such
commitments,.13 One virtue of both sets
of indicators is that they are normalized
for system size, thus permitting com-
parisons across time.
Table 6, then, is divided into two parts,
with the Alliance Aggregation scores on
the left and the Alliance Commitment
scores on the right. After showing, for
each of the twenty years, the number of
states in the system and the number in
the major power sub-system, we present
four separate indicators of Alliance Ag-
gregation : the percentage of the system’s
members who are in one or more allian-
ces of any class; the percentage in defense
pacts only; the percentage of major pow-
ers in any alliance; and the percentage
of majors in defense pacts only. On the
right hand side, under Alliance Commit-
ment, we show the following ratios be-
tween the number of national commit-
ments and the system or sub-system size:
the number of commitments of any class
per member of the total system; number
of defense pact commitments of any class
by major powers (regardless of partner’s
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status) per major; and number of major
power defense pact commitments per
major.
Having computed these ten indicators
for each of the twenty years, we and oth-
ers may next wonder as to their utility
for analytical purposes. As independent,
intervening, or dependent variables, we
may find one or more of these several
measures useful, depending on the sys-
temicfocusandtheoreticalinquiryathand.
But for more general purposes, it might
be useful to have either a single combined
index, or to select one of the indices as
generally representative. The first could
be generated by a variety of techniques,
among which the ’construct mapping’
version of factor analysis (Jones, 1966)
would seem particularly appropriate. We
do not offer such combined measures
here, but do suggest a basis for the second
strategy. That is, if we find that the scores
of all or most of the separate measures
show a high correlation vis-h-vis one
another, one may then be justified in
using any one of them for certain purposes.
Whereas the picture for much of the
1816-1939 period was a rather confusing
and erratic one, the post-World War II
pattern is remarkably clear. Even a
cursory visual inspection of Table 6
reveals that any rank-order correlation
would be extremely high; whether one
compares across alliance classes, nation
types, or alternative indices, the years
would fall into essentially the same rank-
ing. Likewise, if we treated our data in
interval scale fashion, any of the appro-
priate correlation coefficients would turn
out to be remarkably high. Thus we do
not include here any of the correlation
matrices which were quite necessary in
the earlier paper.
Summary and speculation
In this final section we want to compare
the period under review here with that
embraced in the original inquiry, but be-
fore doing so, it might be useful to sum-
marize (verbally and statistically) the al-
liance patterns of this more recent period
by itself. The post-World War II scene
divides rather naturally into three sub-
periods. The first of these, extending up
through 1951, saw not only the liquida-
tion of the most severe war in human
history and the establishment of a collec-
tive security system which might prevent
another such holocaust, but the creation
of an unprecedented number of alliances.
While such ’collective defense’ treaties
were explicitly permitted by the United
Nations Charter, the speed with which
they were formed could only cast doubt
on the expressions of confidence which
accompanied the birth of the world or-
ganization. By 1947, 71 per cent of the
nations in the interstate system were in
one or more alliances of one class or
another, and 54 per cent of them were
in the more concrete defense pacts;
moreover, by the next year, 100 per cent
of the major powers were already com-
mitted to defense pacts, and when this
flurry of alliance-making came to an end
in 1951, three-quarters of all the system’s
members were allied, as were all of the
major powers.
The second period, extending from
1951 through 1959, was exceptionally
stable in terms of alliance aggregation
and alliance commitment scores, with
no appreciable movement into, out of,
or between, alliance blocs, even though
the size of the system rose from 75 to 89.
This is not to say, however, that no new
treaties of alliance were consummated.
That decade saw the establishment of
CENTO, SEATO, and the Warsaw Pact,
and these certainly helped to further
institutionalize the cold war cleavage.
On the other hand, most of the alliance
bonds represented in these three defense
pacts had already been established, al-
beit sometimes at the entente level, via
prior bilateral treaties. Hence - and this
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is precisely why our measures do not
suffice for all theoretical purposes -
there was no appreciable increase in the
several indices during the 1950’s.
A third period, from 1960 to the close
of our study in 1965, was characterized
by a momentary decline in both alliance
aggregation and alliance commitment
scores (largely as a result of the influx of
new states) followed by a rapid rise in
these indicators to new heights. By 1965,
the year we close our study, 81 per cent
of the states in the system were allied, and
the Alliance Commitment Indicator
showed an average of 16.8 alliances for ev-
ery member in the system. During the seven
years from 1959 to 1965 the system in-
creased in size from 89 to 124, leading
to a much larger denominator in our
ratio, but the several new alliances
(largely African) led to a comparable
increase in the numerator.
Turning from the sheer magnitude of
our ten different indices of aggregation
and commitment, another striking ele-
ment is the relatively ’natural’ as well as
stable pattern which developed. That is,
once the ’cold war’ confrontation became
apparent, all but five of the European
members of the system,14 and a good
many in the other regions, had cast their
lots with either the American or the
Soviet bloc. In Asia, two relatively estab-
lished states - Thailand and the Philip-
pines - joined with two newly indepen-
dent ones - Pakistan and Malaysia - to
link up with SEATO. On top of this,
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea had
bilateral commitments with the U.S.,
which was the major architect of SEATO.
On the opposing side, for much of these
two decades, the Asian states of China,
North Korea, and Mongolia were linked
formally to the Soviet Union, while
North Vietnam was an informal member
of this anti-Western configuration. Equal-
ly interesting in this regard is the fact
that, aside from two non-aggression
pacts, none of the system members which
began the cold war as announced neu-
trals defected from that position to join
the major power blocs. At one point
(the Bandung conference of 1955) there
was some discussion of an alliance of the
nonaligned nations to formalize that
state of affairs, but it was not considered
necessary enough to justify the costs and
obligations which might be involved.15
In Latin America, Africa, and the
Middle East, likewise, the picture showed
little change over these two decades. The
former region’s members revived their
pre-war regional bloc affiliated with the
U.S. in the form of the Organization of
American States, and only Cuba failed
to remain in it during the entire period.
In Africa, despite the pro-Soviet inclin-
ation of the ’Casablanca group’, the
Organization of African Unity insti-
tutionalized the neutrality (in the cold
war context at least) of almost every
state in the region. In the north, the
Arab League embraced all of the Moslem
nations of North Africa and the Middle
East. Thus, from the Dardanelles to the
Cape, every system member was in one
alliance or another, except for Israel and
South Africa.16
The above patterns, while they held
for most of the period under review, do
not tell the entire story. As we urged in
the earlier paper and elsewhere in this
one, formal written alliances offer only
one index of the system’s basic config-
urations. A more complete picture of the
system at any point in time must certain-
ly take account of political alignments
and predispositions which stem from
strategic, geographic, economic, and ide-
ological factors. And while all of these
factors do exercise some impact on the
decisions which lead to formal alliance,
they do not all necessarily produce the
same alliance configurations.
As a matter of fact, one of the work-
ing - but not yet tested - assumptions
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of this project is that the peacefulness of
the system depends very much on the
existence of strong cross-pressures among
states, varying as to which sectors of
activity and concern are involved. In
other words, we posit that high alliance
aggregation and commitment scores need
not necessarily make the system more
war-prone by and of themselves. But if
such conditions are accompanied by
configurations in which many of the
states in the system divide up into two
opposing blocs whose composition is
constant across a wide range of issues,
then we would expect the salutary effects
of the ’invisible hand’ to be seriously
inhibited. With the pluralistic, cross-
cutting bonds thus weakened, we hypo-
thesize that war becomes much more
probable.17
This consideration leads, then, to our
concluding comments. We found that
high alliance aggregation scores in the
nineteenth century did not precede, or
predict to, increases in the incidence of
war. On the contrary, the most peaceful
periods in the 1816-99 period were
largely those which were preceded by the
highest levels of alliance aggregation and
commitment. In the twentieth century,
however, quite the reverse obtained, with
high alliance levels predicting all too
regularly to sharp increases in the fre-
quency, magnitude, and severity of war
(Singer & Small, 1968).
One plausible explanation might be that
nineteenth century alliances were largely
’affairs of convenience’ rather than ’mar-
riages of passion’, to reverse the conven-
tional idiom. That is, only as the tra-
dition of quiet diplomacy among cul-
turally similar elites gave way to the
welfare state, rising public and partisan
involvement in foreign policy, and ex-
tensive use of psychological mobilization
techniques, did alliance bonds become
increasingly inflexible and dysfunctional.
Under such conditions, movement into
and out of alliances became increasingly
inhibited, and what had formerly been
thought of as rational diplomacy and
Realpolitik became a matter of perfidy
and condemnation. The question, then,
is whether - assuming that this model is
an accurate reflection of reality - the
slight movement toward a loosening of
the cold war alliance bonds in the 1960’s
will help make ours a more stable system.
After all, the only other times in which
the alliance indices stood at levels even
approximately as high were 1912-14 and
1937-39, and the consequences then were
disastrous.
Appendix A. Substantive Modifications of’
Original Data
In any enterprise of this kind, the re-
searcher is bound to discover new or
conflicting facts as the project unfolds
and as comments come in from others in
the field. This has certainly been our ex-
perience in the Correlates of War pro-
ject, and as a consequence, the following
substantive modifications in our data
have become desirable. First, these dates
of qualification for system membership
have been changed: Cuba, from 1934 to
1902; Hungary, from 1920 to 1919;
Czechoslovakia, from 1919 to 1918; Esto-
nia, Latvia, and Lithuania, from 1920 to
1918, and Yemen, from 1934 to 1926.
Second, we are now persuaded that the
Anglo-Portuguese defense pact of 1899
should be coded as surviving World War
I, and terminating only with the NATO
treaty (which supersedes it) rather than in
1914, as originally coded. Third, new evi-
dence suggests that the 1933 treaty be-
tween Finland and eight Latin American
states did not satisfy our criteria and
should not be classified as an alliance in
the sense used here; it is therefore ex-
cluded from our revised compilation.
And last, we had originally ignored a trea-
ty partner, and also overrated the classifi-
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cation of the Saudi-Arabian-Yemeni alli-
ance of 1937. It should now be coded as
an Iraqi-Saudi entente of 4/36, to which
Yemen adhered in 4/37. Those who utilize
our data decks will find these modifica-
tions already made, but those who are
working from the article itself should note
the changes.
As a further aid to readers who are
interested in alliance patterns since 1816,
we offer again our basic listing (with the
above modifications) from the original
article. Sources and the distinctions
between central and total system mem-
bers have been eliminated for the sake
of simplicity.






* We are indebted to a number of scholars who are using, and have commented upon, the earlier
study of which this is a continuation. In addition to those identified in the References we would
like to particularly thank Bruce Russett, who has helped considerably in our data acquisition, and
has gone over this manuscript in detail in the course of our collaboration on the role of alliances
in the international system. Since his theoretical concerns are somewhat different from ours, there
will be appreciable disparities between our data and those which he will be reporting; see Russett
(1968).
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1 In addition to several master and doctoral dissertations which have utilized those materials,
and some employment for teaching and simulation purposes, there are several other papers based
on these data; see for example, Haas (1968) and Zinnes (1967). We have ourselves published two
studies based on them; see Singer & Small (1967 and 1968).
2 Much of this work will be found in such journals as the present one, The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, and Peace Research Society Papers, and a representative sampling is available in
Quantitative International Politics (Singer, 1968).
3 The entire data deck may be had at nominal cost from the authors, or from Raymond Tanter,
Director of International Relations Archive, ICPR, University of Michigan.
4 On the basis of his UN Treaty Series project, however, Rohn (1968, p. 177) concludes ’no
government had ever checked whether all their treaties actually appeared in the UNTS,’ and that
no hard evidence as to its completeness yet exists. In one such inquiry he found a 23 per cent gap
between ’Canada’s own published treaty records and Canada’s treaties in the UNTS’ (1966, p.
116).
5 We have not had a chance to consult Treaties and Alliances of the World (1969), a new volume
which may prove to be useful.
6 A small terminological change was also made. In order to differentiate between independent
national entities which had all the earmarks of sovereignty and thus qualified for inclusion, and
those which lacked one or more critical attributes of statehood, we now include both sets of na-
tions in the international system, but only include the former in the more restricted interstate system.
7 There are a few minor exceptions: India, despite League membership was not included until
1947, and Byelorussia and the Ukraine have never been included despite UN membership. The
alternative rule is necessary because several important states are not UN members: Switzerland
and the two Germanies, Koreas, and Vietnams.
8 For diplomatic status data and rankings, see Singer & Small (1966a) and Singer, Handley, &
Small (1969); for military-industrial data and rankings, see Singer et al. (1969).
9 The nation code numbers, which have been adopted by a number of projects other than those
at Yale and Michigan, and by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, are presen-
ted in Russett, Singer, & Small (1968).
10 The designations Class I, II, and III suggest a hierarchy based upon levels of political commit-
ment, with the defense pact a more serious commitment than the neutrality pact, and the neu-
trality pact a more serious commitment than the entente. While a Class I alliance obviously is
more serious than a Class II or a Class III, a Class III may be more serious than a Class II. In the
nineteenth century, a neutrality pact was generally a more serious commitment than an entente.
In the twentieth century, however, the entente seems to be a more serious commitment than the
non-aggression pact.
11 While we are not immediately concerned with such alliances, we are planning to gather data
on them in the near future. Aside from alliances contracted during the two wars, this will most
likely involve fewer than 10 alliances.
12 In the original study, we used the concept of Alliance Involvement, measuring dyadic bonds via
the equation (-1)/2. We believe that a more valid measure is the total number of nation-to-
nation alliance commitments existing at any given time; thus, all such commitments, not only the
dominant ones, are counted, and for any given alliance the number of commitments is n(-1).
13 Such concentration might be computed by use of the Gini index, for example, which reflects
what fraction of the system’s members account for what fraction of the commitments in force.
It should also be noted that whereas the decimal point was omitted from Tables 5 and 6 of the
original paper, we decided that the Alliance Commitment score would be more meaningful if we
did include it here. The other difference, as indicated earlier, is that we have not computed either
the Alliance Aggregation or Alliance Commitment Indicators for neutrality and entente agree-
ments separately, since there were so few of either in this post-1945 period.
14 These were the three traditionally non-aligned states (Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland),
Spain, whose exclusion from NATO was largely in deference to anti-facist views in some of the
Western nations, and Yugoslavia, which left the Soviet bloc in 1948.
15 A provocative hypothesis regarding the costs and gains of alliance membership, and the coa-
lition building strategies which might be expected to result, is in Riker (1962). That hypothesis,
based largely on domestic political systems, is now being tested for the international system; see
Singer and Bueno de Mesquita (1969). A more general model of the factors that go into alliance
formation is in Russett (1968).
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16 Another might be Rhodesia, but its failure to achieve any substantial diplomatic recognition
after the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, leaves it outside of our interstate system.
17 The reasoning behind this classical balance of power argument is summarized and partially
operationalized in Deutsch & Singer (1964) and partially supported in Singer & Small (1968).
For a critical re-analysis of our data, see Zinnes (1967); other discussions of the issue are Gulick
(1955), Liska (1962), Rothstein (1968) and Waltz (1964). A suggestive alternative model is in
Galtung (1964).
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